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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS






   v.
RIVERSIDE TOWNSHIP BOARD OF EDUCATION;
J. ALAN FERNER;
JODI LENNON j/s/a,
               Appellants
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. No. 01-cv-00758)
District Judge:  Honorable Robert B. Kugler
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 11, 2008
Before:  FISHER, HARDIMAN and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: January 18, 2008  )
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
1J. Alan Ferner and Jodi Lennon are also listed as defendants in this case.  For ease
of reference, all of these defendants will be referred to as “Riverside.”
2
FISHER, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff Charles Weisberg instituted a lawsuit on a variety of theories averring that
his employer, defendant Riverside Township Board of Education (“Riverside”),1 failed to
properly accommodate his alleged disability, which he had acquired as the result of an
accident at work.  The District Court granted summary judgment for Riverside and
dismissed Weisberg’s claims in their entirety, but denied Riverside’s motion for attorney
fees and sanctions against Weisberg.  Riverside appeals from the denial of attorney’s fees,
alleging that Weisberg’s underlying disability claim was frivolous and that the District
Court abused its discretion in not imposing attorney fees.  Riverside also appeals from the
denial of sanctions, arguing that Weisberg delivered false deposition testimony in “bad
faith” and that the District Court likewise abused its discretion in not imposing sanctions
for this behavior, or in the alternative, that the District Court should have held a “proof
hearing” to determine the validity of Weisberg’s excuse for having delivered the false
deposition testimony.
I.
We write exclusively for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and
legal history of this case.  Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our
analysis.
3Weisberg has been an employee of Riverside since 1972 as director of the Child
Study Team.  On June 19, 1998, while at work, Weisberg sustained a head and shoulder
injury when a wooden speaker weighing approximately four pounds fell on his head and
shoulders.  Weisberg’s lawsuit alleges that this led to “post-concussion syndrome,” a
condition which caused him extreme fatigue, difficulty focusing, headaches, and
sensitivity to loud noises.  Because of this condition, Weisberg asked Riverside for a
series of accommodations that included placing all directives in writing, granting
additional notice and resources for the completion of projects, limiting his workday to a
maximum of eight hours, and providing a quiet, distraction-free working environment.  In
practical terms, Weisberg claimed that his “extreme fatigue” required him to work a
maximum of forty hours per week, and to adjust the number of hours in his subsequent
work days accordingly if he was required to stay later than 4:00 p.m. on a particular day. 
This would essentially prevent him from attending after-school events, including Board of
Education meetings.  Because of his sensitivity to loud noises, Weisberg further claimed
that he could no longer chaperone other school events, such as basketball games and
school dances.  Conflict with Riverside over these and other “accommodations”
ultimately prompted Weisberg to institute a lawsuit under the Americans with Disabilities
Act (“ADA”), alleging that due to his condition, he was disabled under the Act and
eligible for statutory relief.
At Weisberg’s October 29, 2001 deposition, Riverside posed a series of questions
regarding Weisberg’s actions on the Monday night prior to that day’s deposition.  He
4initially told counsel that he did not remember what he had done the previous Monday
night, but after additional questioning he stated that he had watched the New York Giants
football game at home alone.  Weisberg went on to state that because of his “disability”
there was no way that he could have attended the game; had he done so, he would have
been so fatigued afterwards, that he would have been forced to take the next day off from
work.  Unbeknownst to the plaintiff, and contrary to his testimony, a private investigator
had videotaped him on that previous Monday night, meeting with a group of fans, driving
to Giants Stadium, tailgating in the parking lot, entering the stadium, attending the full
game, exiting after midnight and returning home shortly before 2:00 a.m.  Weisberg had
not, in fact, asked for the following day off from work, despite the alleged restrictions
imposed by his “extreme fatigue.”
When Weisberg was confronted with this discrepancy, he attributed his previous
deposition testimony to “false memory syndrome” and presented a letter from Dr. Mark
Rader explaining that individuals with brain injuries sometimes “concoct” stories that
they sincerely believe to be true when placed under stressful conditions.  It is not clear
that Dr. Rader ever personally treated Weisberg, but in any event his letter merely
explained “false memory syndrome” generally and did not conclusively diagnose
Weisberg with “false memory syndrome.”  Weisberg also presented the affidavits of his
wife and a friend, Charles Pratt, stating that they had witnessed similar instances when
Weisberg had exhibited memory problems.  The District Court ultimately found that
Weisberg had produced insufficient evidence that he was “disabled” under the Act, and
5granted summary judgment for Riverside on all claims.  We affirmed that judgment on
May 11, 2006.  Weisberg v. Riverside Twp. Bd. of Educ., 180 F. App’x 357 (3d Cir. 2006)
(not precedential).
Riverside also filed a motion for attorney’s fees under the ADA and sanctions
pursuant to the court’s inherent powers.  The District Court found that although Weisberg
had not presented evidence of a disability sufficient to withstand summary judgment, he
had presented “some evidence” that he was impaired by “post-concussion syndrome,” and
therefore his claim was not “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.”  Weisberg v.
Riverside Twp. Bd. of Educ., No. Civ. 01-758 (RBK), 2005 WL 2000182, at *1 (D.N.J.
Aug. 18, 2005) (unreported) (citing Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412,
421 (1978)).  The District Court also determined that it had the power to impose sanctions
against Weisberg if it found that he had acted in “bad faith,” id. at *2 (citing Chambers v.
NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45-46 (1991).  While the District Court acknowledged that
Weisberg’s “false memory syndrome” excuse was “somewhat dubious,” it found that the
supporting evidence “casts enough doubt” on Weisberg’s purported bad faith for the
Court to exercise its discretion in refraining from imposing sanctions on that basis.  Id. at
*3.
II.
We have jurisdiction over appeals from orders of the District Court under 28
U.S.C. § 1291.  We review determinations by the District Court regarding the imposition
of attorney’s fees for abuse of discretion.  Lanni v. New Jersey, 259 F.3d 146 (3d Cir.
2Christiansburg dealt with a Title VII fee-shifting provision while the case at bar
involves the fee-shifting provision of the ADA.  As the District Court points out, we have
not yet addressed whether and how Christiansburg and its progeny apply to ADA cases in
the Third Circuit.  Weisberg, 2005 WL 2000182, at *1.  However, as both parties assume
that Christiansburg and its progeny apply to the present case, we will similarly assume
that they apply for purposes of our review here, as the question of whether this is in fact
the appropriate standard is not squarely before us.
6
2001); EEOC v. L.B. Foster Co., 123 F.3d 746, 750 (3d. Cir 1997).  “We also review an
award of sanctions pursuant to the court’s inherent powers for an abuse of discretion.”  In
re Prudential Ins. Co. America Sales Practice Litigation Agent Actions, 278 F.3d 175,
181 (3d Cir. 2002).
III.
Under the “fee-shifting provision” of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12205, a district court
is empowered to award attorney’s fees to a prevailing party at its discretion.  “In
Christiansburg, the Supreme Court clarified that the standard for awarding attorney’s fees
to prevailing defendants is not the same as the standard for prevailing plaintiffs.” 
E.E.O.C. v. L.B. Foster Co., 123 F.3d 746, 750 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Christiansburg
Garment Co., 434 U.S. 412).2  In such a case, the district court may impose fees if the
action was “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.”  Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at
421.  The decision to award fees to a prevailing defendant is not based on “hard and fast
rules” and should be made on a “case-by-case basis.”  L.B. Foster Co., 123 F.3d at 751. 
While not an exclusive list, we have considered such factors as whether the plaintiff
established a prima facie case; whether the defendant offered to settle; whether the trial
7court dismissed the case prior to trial; whether the question was one of first impression;
and whether the plaintiff risked a “real threat of injury[.]”  See id.; Barnes Found. v. Twp.
of Lower Merion, 242 F.3d 151, 158 (3d Cir. 2001).  As the District Court acknowledges,
some of these factors support Riverside’s argument, particularly the fact that Weisberg
did not establish a prima facie case, did not show a real threat of injury, the defendants
did not offer to settle, and the issue was not novel or one of first impression.  However,
we agree with the District Court that the evidence that Weisberg presented, while
inadequate, especially in light of Weisberg’s credibility, to support even a prima facie
case for disability, illustrated that he likely does, in fact, suffer from some sort of medical
condition affecting his “concentration, vision, mood and energy” and that his claim
cannot therefore be said to be wholly “without foundation.”  Thus, the District Court did
not abuse its discretion when it declined to award attorney’s fees to Riverside.
With regard to sanctions, the District Court correctly found that courts possess an
inherent power to assess sanctions where a party has “acted in bad faith, vexatiously,
wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.”  Chambers, 501 U.S. at 45-46.  On appeal,
Riverside presses its claim that the District Court abused its discretion by not imposing
sanctions against Weisberg for his false deposition testimony that he did not attend the
New York Giants game when he in fact did so.  The sole excuse offered by Weisberg is
“false memory syndrome,” a condition never claimed by Weisberg prior to his false
statement.  As Riverside correctly notes, the physician’s letter he presents to the Court
merely describes the condition, but does not diagnose Weisberg with it.  While this
8certainly weakens Weisberg’s case, he does provide some corroboration in the form of the
affidavits of his wife and Charles Pratt, who state that they have witnessed similar
memory lapses in the past, as well as the evidence of his head injury generally.  While his
excuse stills strains credulity, the District Court is committed with the discretion to
impose sanctions and we see no compelling reason to disturb its decision on this issue. 
The District Court, being more directly familiar with this case, this plaintiff, and the
context of these statements, is in a better position than we are in making such a
determination.  We therefore decline to find that the District Court abused its discretion in
this case.  In addition, Riverside offers no legal support for the proposition that we must
remand for a “proof hearing” in this matter.  Because the District Court has not abused its
discretion in not granting sanctions, we see no compelling reason to grant such a request. 
Moreover, we find appellant’s additional arguments unavailing.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court.
